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Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPV): Flight Rationale for 
the Space Shuttle Program 
Introducing composite vessels into the Space Shuttle Program represented a significant technical 
achievement. Each Orbiter vehicle contains 24 (nominally) Kevlar tanks for storage of pressurized 
helium (for propulsion) and nitrogen (for life support).  The use of composite cylinders saved 752 
pounds per Orbiter vehicle compared with all-metal tanks.  The weight savings is significant 
considering each Shuttle flight can deliver 54,000 pounds of payload to the International Space 
Station.   
In the wake of the Columbia accident and the ensuing Return to Flight activities, the Space Shuttle 
Program, in 2005, re-examined COPV hardware certification.  Incorporating COPV data that had been 
generated over the last 30 years and recognizing differences between initial Shuttle Program 
requirements and current operation, a new failure mode was identified, as composite stress rupture 
was deemed credible.  The Orbiter Project undertook a comprehensive investigation to quantify and 
mitigate this risk.  First, the engineering team considered and later deemed as unfeasible the option 
to replace existing all flight tanks.  Second, operational improvements to flight procedures were 
instituted to reduce the flight risk and the danger to personnel.  Third, an Orbiter reliability model was 
developed to quantify flight risk.   
Laser profilometry inspection of several flight COPVs identified deep (up to 20 mil) depressions on the 
tank interior.  A comprehensive analysis was performed and it confirmed that these observed 
depressions were far less than the criterion which was established as necessary to lead to liner 
buckling.  Existing fleet vessels were exonerated from this failure mechanism. 
Because full validation of the Orbiter Reliability Model was not possible given limited hardware 
resources, an Accelerated Stress Rupture Test of a flown flight vessel was performed to provide 
increased confidence.  A Bayesian statistical approach was developed to evaluate possible test results 
with respect to the model credibility and thus flight rationale for continued operation of the Space 
Shuttle with existing flight hardware.   
A non-destructive evaluation (NDE) technique utilizing Raman Spectroscopy was developed to directly 
measure the overwrap residual stress state.  Preliminary results provide optimistic results that 
patterns of fluctuation in fiber elastic strains over the outside vessel surface could be directly 
correlated with increased fiber stress ratios and thus reduced reliability. 
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Challenger and Columbia: Context of Safety
2
Challenger Disaster led to the Implementation of the Philosophy of the ‘First Law 
of Safety’:  The design and its operations must be proven to be safe - it is 
not the system safety engineer’s task to prove that it is unsafe.
COPV Investigation represents a NASA success in understanding challenging 
and complex technical issues and successfully mitigating risk.
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Outline
 Original Shuttle Program Design & 
Operating Requirements
 Original Safety Considerations
 Concerns Raised During ‘Return to 
Flight (2005)’ after Columbia Accident
 Tank Replacement
 Operational Improvements
 Orbiter Reliability Model
• Stress-Rupture Life of Kevlar Fiber 
• Stress Ratio Model-Orbiter Tanks
• Temperature Dependence
• Accounting for Material Variability 
and Data Uncertainty
 Recent Discovery of Titanium Liner 
Ripples on Vessel Interior
• Analysis of Potential Buckling
 Validating Reliability Model
• Accelerated Stress Rupture Test
• Bayesian Analysis – how to 
incorporate new information
• Raman Spectroscopy measurement 
of current fiber stresses
 Future for Composite Vessels at NASA
• International Space Station
• NORS
• Commercial Satellites
• Future Exploration
 Aging Concerns for Kevlar and Carbon 
COPV
• Material Degradation and Radiation 
effects on Lifetime
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Orbiter COPV Configuration
Main Propulsion System  (MPS) 
Three 40” He
Seven 26” He
Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS)
Two 40” He
Reaction Control System (RCS)
Two 19” He (each) 
Left, Right and Forward
Environmental Control and Life Support 
System (ECLSS)
Four to Six 26” N2
• Titanium liner (0.104” thick) and boss.
• Overwrap: Kevlar-49 fibers in Epoxy (0.739” thick)
Composite carries ~ 70-80% of load
(at operating pressure)
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Location of Orbiter
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COPV Weight Savings
 24 Kevlar COPVs saved approximately 752 pounds per 
Orbiter Vehicle (compared to an all metal tank design)
 Orbiter Dry Weight
• 176,056 pounds (Endeavour)
• 176,419 pounds (Discovery)
• 176,413 pounds (Atlantis)
 Payload Capability 
• 54,000 pounds* (28.5 deg Orbit)
• 36,200 pounds* (51.6 deg Orbit)
*including manager’s reserve, payload attach hardware and flight 
support equipment
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Original Design Criteria
 Original requirements: 100 mission in 10 years
• 1988: Life certification extended to 20 years
 Primary Failure Mechanism Considered: Liner Failure (parent material or weld)
 Led to Design Requirement: Leak Before Burst (LBB)
• Liner Failure Mechanism: 
– Imposed: hen the liner fails (parent material or weld) a pinhole develops such that the pressurized 
gasses would slowly leak through the overwrap, but the liner would remain sufficiently intact such 
that a more sudden unzipping or explosive burst failure would not occur
– Noted: However, sudden liner unzipping did in fact occur during several proof tests.
• Fail Operational, Fail Safe:
– If one tank were lost, Shuttle Program could continue its mission
– If two tanks were lost, Orbiter could return home safely
– Failure of 2 40’’ MPS tanks – Intact abort
– Failure of 2 40’’ OMS tanks – Blowdown mode, sufficient propellant for deorbit burn
– Failure of 2 ECLSS, 26’’ MPS or RCS tanks – System redundancy mitigated catastrophic failure for loss of gas
– Accounted for risk of overpressurization of the vehicle and effect on structural integrity
 Verification: Leak Before Burst (LBB)
• 20 Tanks were tested (artificially fatigued with induced flaws in order to fail in the liner).
• Experiments confirmed LBB failure mechanism.
 Composite Stress Rupture was mitigated by design; the maximum burst pressure 
was selected such that the stress in the fibers was believed low enough to 
preclude failure in the life of the program.
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Original Design Criteria: Composite Stress 
Rupture
– Original certification of Orbiter tanks was based on 2 sets of data:
JSC fleet leader test program – 25 vessels (very little time accumulated at that point)
– Intended to envelope fleet tanks in both stress ratio and time
Statistical reliability models based on Lawrence Livermore National Lab (LLNL) epoxy-impregnated 
strand and vessel tests (only a few thousand hours accumulated; strand data problematic)
– LLNL tests had small 4.5” dia tanks with low strength but thick (same as overwrap) Aluminum 
liners, pressurized to 50-86% of ultimate fiber stress
– Subsequent data (up to 100,000 hrs) and refined analysis methodology, as well as 
revised stress-ratio calculation by COPV Team (based on actual burst strengths) 
concluded that risk of stress rupture was much higher than original predictions
Led to realization fleet leader program not be enveloping stresses of all fleet tanks 
– Recognized differences exist between LLNL, fleet leader and flight tanks but LLNL data 
is the only statistically large sample of data available
Identified follow-on effort to establish conservatism of LLNL based predictions for Shuttle tanks
Proof testProof testNonePre-test Load
MultipleMultipleOne# Build Spools
HighHighLittle, if anyQuality Control
Kevlar 49 - Type 969Kevlar 49 - Type 969Kevlar 49 - 380 DenierFiber
LRF-092LRF-092DER 332/Jeffamine T-403Resin
ComplexComplexdelta axi-symmetricOverwrapPattern
0.285 (RCS He) - 0.739 (OMS He)0.250.04OverwrapThickness (in)
0.044 (RCS He) - 0.104 (OMS He)0.040.04Liner Thickness (in)
Ti-6Al-4V5086 Al1100 AlLiner Material
19 - 4010.44.5Diameter (in)
Fleet VesselsFleet LeadersLLNL Vessels
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Return to Flight: COPV Safety Reconsidered
 Revisit of Orbiter COPV Design
• Re-examination of original Lifetime Certification data, Qualification 
Test Reports and Vessel Data Packages resulted in new concerns
• Calculated probability of having a failure after 113 flights: 0.20  
– Too high to accept the risk; not too high to discredit risk
• Composite stress rupture failure equivalent to explosive energy of 
14 lbs of TNT 
• Shuttle Program: 30-40 missions (per vehicle) in 30 years
(compares with Original requirements: 100 mission in 10 years and 1988 
re-certification to 20 years)
 Orbiter Engineering Team Tasked:
1. Investigate tank replacement/procurement new COPV
2. Make Improvements to Shuttle operations to reduce effective 
time at pressure
3. Develop an Orbiter reliability model to quantify future risk based 
on more recent recent test data and analysis of past data
9
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Rank % of Total Cumulative Total
Probability
(1/n) Failure Group
1 30.9 30.9 3.6E-03(1 in 277)
Micrometeoroids and Orbital Debris (MMOD) strikes Orbiter on 
orbit leading to Loss of Crew or Vehicle (LOCV) on orbit or entry
2 13.2 44.1 1.5E-03(1 in 652)
Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME)-induced SSME catastrophic 
failure
3 10.2 54.3 1.2E-03(1 in 840)
Ascent debris strikes Orbiter Thermal Protection System (TPS) 
leading to LOCV on orbit or entry
4 7.0 61.3 8.2E-04(1 in 1,220) Crew error during entry
5 5.6 66.9 6.5E-04(1 in 1,530)
Reusable Solid Rocket Motors (RSRM) - induced RSRM 
catastrophic failure
6 1.6 68.5 1.8E-04(1 in 5,510) Common cause failure of the Electrical Power System on orbit
7 1.5 70.0 1.7E-04(1 in 5,890)
Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) shaft 
seal fracture
8 1.3 71.3 1.5E-04(1 in 6,480) SRB booster separation motor debris strikes Orbiter windows
9 1.3 72.6 1.5E-04(1 in 6,640)
An existing crack in the Orbiter APU turbine wheel propagates 
resulting in catastrophic failure of the APU during entry
10 1.2 73.8 1.4E-04(1 in 7,350) Common cause failure of the APU System on entry
COPV Risk Relative to Top Shuttle Program Risks 
(Iteration 3.1)
COPV 
Risk
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COPV Tank Replacement
Investigated Hardware Modification Option to replace existing COPVs
Certified procedures exist for replacement of MPS and ECLSS tanks.
Consider feasibility to replace existing OMS/RCS tanks.
40” OMS He Tank
18” RCS
He TanksPresented by:
W. F. Rogers
10/05/2005
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Margin Improvement Options 
(OMS/RCS COPV Replacement)
Option Description
Margin Post 
Implementation Relative Complexity Risks
Schedule: 
Hardware 
On Dock
Relative 
Cost
1A
Replace Existing Tanks with 
new drop-in MC282-0082-XXXX 
replacements
Acceptable
Low:
• New Tank
• OMS 40" Tank Replacement
Medium:
• Tank procurement schedule
• OMS Pod skin damage
18 months Medium
1B Replace Existing Tanks with nearest COTS equivalent Acceptable
High:
• Requires extensive redesign
   of OMS Pod structure and/or
   helium system
High:
• Nearest COTS tank that meets minimum
   OMS helium quantity requirements is a
   cylindrical tank substantially larger than
   the existing tank; would require complete
   redesign, remanufacture, and recertifica-
   tion of the OMS Pods
24 - 36 
months High
2 Swap OMS 40" tanks with MPS 40" tanks
UNACCEPTABLE
Minimal 
improvement
Low:
• 40" OMS Tank Replacement
• 40" MPS Tank Replacement
Medium:
• OMS Pod skin damage
• Aft compartment damage
0 months Low
3
Add an additional tank or tanks 
to increase OMS system volume 
to reduce pressure
Acceptable for 
OMS; Not 
Applicable to RCS
High:
• New plumbing/tank mounting
   provisions in aft
• New instrumentation (temp
   sensors)
• New interface (Aft/OMS)
• Recert of OMS system etc.
• 26" tank procurement
High:
• System design
• Tank procurement schedule
• Addition of new failure modes
• Damage in Aft Compartment during mod
• RCS tank margins
14 - 18 
months 
(assumes 
use of 2 
tanks from 
Logistics 
inventory)
Medium
4
Strengthen existing tanks by 
adding additional layers of 
overwrap
Unknown
High
• Requires extensive
   development, analysis, and
   qualification effort
High:
• Margin improvement may not be
   quantifiable
• Many technical unknowns (low technical
   maturity - TMM Level 2)
• Likely requires new procurement to
   replace devel/qual tanks
14 - 18 
months
Medium-
High
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OMS Tank Removal Replacement Feasibility
Option Description Feasibility Relative Complexity Risks
1 Remove RCS stinger and extract tank out end of Pod Feasible
High:
• Requires cutting 10 RCS prop. lines
• Thrusters must be refurbished
Medium:
• RCS system damage
• Stinger structural reattacment
2 Remove OMS NTO tank and extract He tank out opening
Not Feasible
Bulkhead opening 
is too small
High:
• Would require extensive redesign &
   modification of OMS Pod Structure
High:
• OMS Pod modification would be
   extensive
3 Remove Pod aft outboard skin and extract tank out opening Feasible
Medium:
• Requires removal of 180 HiLoks
• Requires removal of NTO tank
Medium:
• OMS Pod skin damage
Identified Risks:
Composite honeycomb OMS Pod skin damage 
during HiLok removal
Determined accessibility of HiLok collars –
99% accessible if NTO tank is removed first
Identified skin repair procedures
Edge distance is sufficient to over-size holes
Began discussions with WSTF for a trial-run 
on the Fleet Leader OMS Pod
WSTF fleet leader helium tanks may be used for COPV 
testing, forcing removal anyway
Initiated Structural Model To Assess Pod 
Rotation With Skin Removed
Identified GSE and Developed Concepts 
Skin handling strongback
Initiated Preliminary Implementation Plans 13
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MPS Tank Replacement of Existing Flight Spares
 OMS and MPS tanks (identical parts) were deemed the 
highest risk to the program.
• Two flight spares were used to replace the two MPS vessels, 
COPVs with lowest estimated reliability (SN 006 and 007).
• SN 006 was designated as a flight spare
• SN 007 was later ‘sacrificed’ for the Accelerated Stress Rupture 
Test.
• Main cause (now recognized in hindsight) was the low burst 
strength performance of these 40 in. diameter vessels 
compared to others, especially 26 in. MPS vessels (virtually 
scale models)
– Burst strength fell short by about up 15% of that reasonably 
expected
14
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Operational Improvements
Mitigation:  Changes implemented to reduce flight risk
 Two stage load 
• Loading procedure is split into two steps, first to 80% then to designated flight pressure#.  The 
temperature rise during loading corresponds to the fastest accrual of effective hours; the two step 
process allows the tanks to dissipate this heat in order to minimize the effect of the overshoot. 
 Pressurization improvements 
• Fill requirements are set to specified temperature limits and precise tank fill level rather than 
minimum level.
 System Checkout
• Tests performed at 80% of operational value instead of 100%.
 Reduced time at load 
• Servicing (loading flight gasses) occurs later in the launch countdown cycle; OMS tank loads 
moved to 4 days prior to launch (previously as early as 12 days).
 Pad Clears 
• Ground personnel are prohibited near the vehicle while tanking, which is the highest risk 
procedure 
 Restricted Pad Access 
• Restrict pad access to essential personnel only after pressurization of COPVs
 OMS offload 
• Reduce He pressure on the OMS tanks, reducing the corresponding stress loads
#Temperatures in the past had gone to 180oF (82oC) or higher
15
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Typical MPS Load Profile
Pressure (psia)
Mid Temperature (F)
Aft Temperature (F)
2016
4422
2253
0
93
110
170
78
78
9383
163
-47
30
3600 (80% MOP)
~20 Hours
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Two-Stage Loading Process
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Introducing a “Cheat 
Load”, greatly reduces 
the time at elevated 
temperature and 
pressure.
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Operational Improvements Summary
Subsystem # Old
Loa
d
New 
Loa
d
Cheat
Load
Temp
Limits
(deg F)
Original
Effective 
Hours
Effective 
Hours
(2 day)
OMS (Full
Load) 
2 T-12 T-6 Y 100 200 105
RCS: AFT 
(L/R)
4 120 272 135
RCS: F 2 98 31
MPS 40’’ 3 Y 240 90
MPS: AFT 3 Y 225 93
MPS: MID 4 Y 187 65
ECLSS 4-6 T-90 T-70 N 110 2,500 1,468
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Launch Scrubs and Weather conditions affect actual accrued time.
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OMS Offload
 Reduce helium pressure on the OMS tanks, reducing the 
corresponding stress loads
 Pressure in the helium tanks is driven by the failure scenario of a 
launch abort (Return To Launch Site-RTLS).  In this scenario, it 
is necessary to expel the liquid fuels in the OMS liquid propellant 
tanks in order that the Orbiter vehicle will meet landing center of 
mass constraints.
 Reducing the OMS liquid fuel and corresponding helium pressure 
meets RTLS constraints and only loses 10 pounds Ascent 
Performance Margin (APM).
 OMS COPV pressure is reduced from 4875 psia to 4450 psia.
 New Helium pressure reduces effective accumulated time from 
105 hrs to 35 hrs, reducing stress rupture risk by a factor of 3.
19
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Hours Calculations with Operational 
Improvements
 Evaluation of Accumulated Hours
Flight Vehicle Date OMS (L & R) MPS (L, R & C)
STS-123 OV-105 3/11/08 29.6 12.6 41.8 36.9 45.4
STS-124 OV-103 5/31/08 14.5 16 39.6 42.2 36.5
STS-126 OV-105 11/14/08 33 15 32.9 30.4 38.1
STS-119 OV-103 3/15/09 23.4 23.9 51.3 57.1 47
STS-125* OV-104 5/11/09 100 106 66 63 70.9
STS-127 OV-105 7/15/09 63.2 24 66.9 57.7 74.8
STS-128 OV-103 8/28/09 26.7 29.2 101.7 109.1 94.4
STS-129 OV-104 11/16/09 14.2 15.6 42.6 42.7 47.7
Projected Hours Standard OMS
* Full OMS Load
35 hrs/flight
* 105 hrs/flight
90 hrs/flight
•STS-125 carried a Full OMS Load.
•Red indicates accumulated hours exceeding projections.
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Orbiter Reliability Model 
Orbiter Reliability Model Key Features:
Kevlar database to consider lifetime as a function of stress ratio in fiber 
(effective fiber stress level divided by fiber strength) at burst
 Understand the actual stress ratio of each COPV in the fleet
Two vessels otherwise identical in design (but manufactured at different 
times) could have significantly different stress ratios because of measured 
mechanical response differences during proof testing (e.g. permanent 
volume growth was found to vary by up to a factor of two)
 Account for temperature variations and high excursions 
during pressurization and flight
 Account for actual previous time-under-load history of each 
COPV in the fleet through determining effective accumulated 
time under pressure
21
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Kevlar Industry Database
 Revisited large body of data on strength and stress-rupture of 
Kevlar-49/epoxy composites used in COPVs (got LLNL to 
declassify and release data updates from 1981-1988)
 Applied a micromechanics based statistical model to interpret it 
 Data based
• LLNL (’72-’88, strand and vessels released in 2005) 
• NASA Fleet Leader (‘78-’03)
• Cornell single fiber tests (large replications at various temperatures, ‘82-’06))
• duPont/DOE (‘83-’85) a repeat of LLNL vessel tests effort to resolve spool effect 
anomalies
 Phenomena involved: matrix volume fraction, temperature, size 
effect, loading rate effects, liner effects, spool-to-spool effect
 Result: Eventually obtained consistent view of stress-rupture of 
Kevlar-49/epoxy composites in comparing, fibers, strands and 
various vessel sets 
22
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Kevlar Industry Database
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Kevlar Industry Database
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 Problem 1:  Fiber volume fraction influences effective mean fiber 
strength of Kevlar/epoxy strands (after rule of mixtures calculation)
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Kevlar Industry Database
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 Lifetime vs fiber stress for various Kevlar 49/epoxy strands 
(volume fraction effect originally confounded stress ratio concept)
Copyright © 2010 Boeing. All rights reserved.
BDS | Space Exploration | Engineering & Mission Assurance
Kevlar Industry Database
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 Problem 2: Lifetime of Kevlar 49/epoxy strands at 0.791 fiber stress ratio
showed evidence of “trunsoring” (failures on loading expected based on 
strength distribution) two regimes emerged when finally corrected 
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Kevlar Industry Database
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 Problem 3:  Since 30 vessels were made from each spool (7 spools) serious 
spool effects emerged, so had to develop analytical technique to remove 
spool-to-spool effects uniformly between strength and life
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Kevlar Industry Database
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 Problem 4:  Anomalies in burst strength of Kevlar 49/epoxy pressure 
vessels (LLNL vs duPont-DOE rerun) finally resolved when spool effects 
and liner yield strength differences taken into account
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Kevlar Industry Database
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 Problem 5:  Lifetime discrepancy emerged between LLNL vessels versus 
virtually identical duPont/DOE replicates (as well as strands).  What went 
wrong?  Apparently a p-T Ratchet effect.
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Kevlar Industry Database
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 Considerable temperature 
fluctuations winter to 
summer cause plastic 
liner yielding followed by 
“topping off” and a 
ratchet effect increasing 
the overwrap stress over 
time
 Lifetime of Kevlar 
49/epoxy pressure 
vessels with very thick 
1100-0 Aluminum liners  
tK/tAl ~ 1.00  and  very low 
yield strength (4.5 MPa)
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Kevlar Industry Database
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 How it looked when all the data was put together (~ 1000 data points) 
 If ratchet effect were not accepted as cause of low power-law parameter, flight 
rationale probably not possible 
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Kevlar Industry Database
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 Data on temperature effects  finally resolved the issue ρ ∝ 1/T was key 
discriminator
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Stress Ratio of Orbiter COPV
 For the existing Orbiter vessels, at operating pressure, 
what is the stress ratio are the Kevlar fiber?
 Consider 26’’ Tanks:
• Three tanks were burst to determine
• For operating pressure = 4500 psi, stress ratio ~ 0.47 
• Reliability estimates at these stress ratios for the existing 
Kevlar database gives risk less than 1:1 million (i.e. at least 6 
‘9’s’).
 Consider 40’’ Tanks:
• Burst Pressure of SN 002: 8,010 psia
• Burst Pressure of SN 011: 7,667 psia
• Operating pressure at 4875 psia (OMS) stress ratio SR = 64%
• Operating pressure at 4500 psia (MPS) stress ratio SR = 53%
• Not acceptable reliability estimates 
33
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Tank Production History
Vessel Fiber Stress Ratio tied to performance of individual 40’’ Tanks based on 
original acceptance test data.  
Permanent growth in tank volume during initial autofrettage is key parameter. Large 
volume growth implies through thickness compaction, high stress gradient and thus 
higher stress in inside fibers driving up overall stress ratio.
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Introduce Variability and Uncertainty
 Log Normal Distributions accurately represent uncertainties in 
estimated parameters:
(power-law, ρ, Weibull, β, tref, etc.)
 Definitions:
• Point – Reliability prediction calculated based on the best-
estimated values for key parameters ignoring uncertainty
Monte Carlo Simulations performed; key parameters ‘randomized’ 
with log-normal uncertainty distributions; Reliability calculated:
• Mean – Average reliability from simulation of uncertainty (tied to 
size of data set).
• 95% confidence – The 95% percentile ‘worst case’ (more or less) 
reliability from among the simulation set.
 Shuttle Program based flight decisions on Mean Reliability (best able 
to weigh deep tail uncertainty effects beyond 95% percentile)  
although all three presented reliability numbers calculated for various 
scenarios.
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Incorporating Temperature Dependence
 Based on the time – temperature shift and 
superposition relations, historic loading profiles of the 
Orbiter Vehicle and Operational Improvements, 
reliability was based on predicted future hours per 
flight.
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Shuttle Database and Past Time
 Extensive database provides the opportunity for Engineers 
to calculate the historic cumulative effective time under 
pressure (accounting for temperature and pressure 
variations) of all tanks in the fleet.
 Condition Reliability calculated, Probability of Survival that 
for Past hours plus future hours, given that tank has already 
survived the specified number of past hours.
 Combining:
• Kevlar Database for Lifetime of fibers at given stress ratios
• Stress Ratio for each individual vessel (40’’ OMS and MPS)
• Anticipated Future hours (based on Shuttle operations)
• Monte Carlo Simulation for Mean, Point and 95% Confidence Limit
• Presented per flight, per vehicle and overall program risk
37
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Shuttle Database and Past Time
 Arrhenius  based model in power-law framework
 Convert Stress Ratio at elevated temperature to Stress Ratio 
at reference temperature:
 Time-scale conversion for pressure & temperature change 
follows:
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OV-103 Parameters
Orbiter Reliability Model developed in Matlab
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Life of Program Reliability Estimate
+ =+
Point
Mean
95% CL
.999 944
.999 918
.999 69
.999 85
.999 78
.999 20
.999 997
.999 995
.999 978
.999 994
.999 989
.999 958
.999 66
.999 53
.998 3
OMS Reduced .998 6
.998 0
.992 5
1:710
1:489
1:134
1:2,041
1:1,370
1:370
1:111,111
1:62,500
1:15,625
1:1,099
1:769
1:213
Point
Mean
95% CL
OMS Full
.999 89
.999 84
.999 42
Per Flight
Reliability 
Numbers
OMS Full OMS FullOMS Reduced OMS Reduced
1 Flight 5 Flight 1 Flight 1 Flight 1 Flight 6 Flight
Life of Program 
COPV Reliability
15 Flights Combined
0.999 09
0.998 7
0.995 3
0.999 991
0.999 984
0.999 936
0.999 51
0.999 27
0.997 3
Two Day Launch Scrub  - PRCB 10/18/2007
Cumulative 
Reliability
(per vehicle)
From  # of 
Flights
Life of Program, 15 flight
Failure Likelihood
Note that reliability for each 
individual flight is virtually the 
same for all the individual flights 
through the end of the Program
OMS tank s/n 020 in RP03 is the driver for OV-103 reliability numbers
OMS tank s/n 018 in LP03 is the driver for OV-105 reliability numbers
MPS tank s/n 021 in OV-105 is a large contributor to reliability numbers
OV-103
6 flights
OV-105
7 flights
OV-104
2 flights
From STS-118
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Note: OV-104 numbers based on replaced MPS Tanks.
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Risk Apportionment
EECLS
Stage 1
Load
Stage 2
Load
Stage 1
Hold
Stage 2
Hold
41
Copyright © 2010 Boeing. All rights reserved.
BDS | Space Exploration | Engineering & Mission Assurance
OV-103 Risk Profile 
Table Showing Risk by Subsystem
42
Note: Once the vehicle reaches Orbit, the COPV risk is gone.
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Mitigating Buckling Concerns
Analysis of Potential for Titanium Liner Buckling after 
Proof in a Large Kevlar/Epoxy COPV, AIAA 2009-2520
43
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COPV – Suspect Buckling
44
 During initial internal borescope inspection of 40” COPV S/N 
002 at WSTF an anomalous surface condition was noted
• Borescope inspection performed as part of health assessment –
designated as potential spare for installation in OV-104
 Rippled or wavy appearance observed
• Found throughout (360 around) the membrane regions (both halves)
• Suspect that condition may be result of liner buckling
 Possible impacts of liner buckling
• Reduction in fatigue life
• Change in load sharing properties between liner and overwrap
• Change in reliability 
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Borescope Photographs
45
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Experimentally Observed Surface Depressions
46
26 in. tank
40 in. tank
22 mil depth
Cross-Section of Surface Depressions
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Modeling Steps
47
Step 1: Pressurization up to proof pressure
 Model liner yielding, formation of local valleys from void compaction
 Characteristic shapes compared to measurements.  
 Calculate liner properties. 
Step 2: Depressurization to zero pressure
 Calculate growth of Step 1 deformation.
 Frozen in pressure and moment distributions from Step 1 become 
“forcing functions” in Step 2, driving increased transverse 
displacements, potentially leading to buckling.
 During unloading we track transverse displacements, bending 
moments, and through-thickness liner stress profiles to compare to 
lowered compressive yield thresholds from the Bauschinger effect. 
Step 3: Assembling the results
 Finally we put it all together and assemble the results for the various 
stages up to peak proof pressure and the subsequent depressurization 
to zero vessel pressure.  
 We mention the criteria that allow final assessment of the likelihood of 
liner buckling for various values of initial ‘frozen-in” depression depths 
as seen in profilometry inspection.
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Bauschinger Effect from Yielding
48
Material response in tension differs than in compression.  Bauschinger effect 
becomes key in developing instability wherein extensive prior yielding in tension 
reduces the magnitude of the yield threshold in compression by 30 to 40% 
compared to the virgin annealed state of the titanium. 
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Effect of Reducing Liner Stiffness by 15% on 
Bending Moment
49
Copyright © 2010 Boeing. All rights reserved.
BDS | Space Exploration | Engineering & Mission Assurance
Effect Changing Depression Depth on Interface 
Pressure
50
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Effect Changing Depression Depth on Bending 
Moment
51
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Conclusions
 The key result is that depression depths of up to 40 
mils can be tolerated but above 40 mils, the 
Bauschinger effect dominates and buckling become 
increasingly likely.  
 Note that in the absence of a liner depression, the liner 
is elastically stable in hoop compression even at 
overwrap-liner interface pressures approaching 6000 
psi.
 So far a 40 mil depression has been seen but only in 
the thickened weld band, where this analysis does not 
apply. 
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Accelerated Stress Rupture Test (ASRT)
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ASRT Overview
 Obtain a stress rupture data point from an Orbiter COPV for 
comparison to the baselined COPV stress rupture reliability model.
 Single data point could not validate current model but could provide 
increased confidence in the model predictions
 It was necessary to Accelerate time through holding the tank at 
increased temperature or pressure. 
• COPV test team decided to maintain pressure at 4850 psia and increase 
temperature to 130 deg F (Phase 1) & 160 deg F (Phase 2)
 This test was designed to encompass multiple accelerated stress 
rupture pressurized test phases:
• Phase 1: “moderately accelerated test” 35,575 total effective hours
– Designed to achieve the midpoint of model predicted Point reliability.  
• Phase 2: “aggressively accelerated test” 86,745 total effective hours
– Designed to determine if the test article will exceed the 95% confidence interval of the 
stress rupture model Point reliability prediction.   
• Phase 3  & continued for engineering value 113,000 total effective hours
– Test proceeded to failure, to obtain the first measurement of a stress rupture failure.
– Pressure, Temperature: 5200 psia, at 160oF (Phase 3)
– Pressure, Temperature: 5400 psia, at 173oF (Phase 4)
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Accelerated Stress Rupture Test
55
Test article eventually failed after 3,100,000 effective hours
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Bayes Analysis
Bayes Analysis and Reliability Implications of Stress-Rupture Testing of a Kevlar/Epoxy 
COPV using Temperature and Pressure Acceleration, AIAA 2009-2569 
With Pappu L.N. Murthy, NASA Glenn Research Center
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Statistical Approach to Evaluating ASRT Result
ASRT Success Criteria (to increase model confidence):
Approach 1: Will the tank survive as long as the model predicts?
Compare SN007 life to model point reliability.
Problem – Uncertainty in model not considered.
Approach 2: How can one statistically accept current model based 
on a single data point?
Hypothesis: Assume Model overpredicts lifetime.
Question: Does SN007 lifetime allow us to reject hypothesis 
by lasting longer than criterion?  
If so, then data point confirms model.
Approach 3: Can a statistical argument be made to better select 
among two (or mode) candidate Orbiter Stress Ratio models?
Method: Establish lifetime predictions for candidate models 
and compare
57
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Reliability Predictions for Pessimistic vs
Optimistic Scenario
58
Uncertainty as a function of reliability for the different 
Stress Ratio Models.
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Main Finding and Where We Seem to be Today
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ASTR Summary:
Update to Orbiter Reliability Model
 The ‘success’ of the Accelerated Stress Rupture Test has 
not been fully investigated.
 Orbiter Project made a conscious decision not to update the 
reliability model based on a successful Accelerated Stress 
Rupture Test
• Increasing the model fidelity was not needed to make flight 
decisions
• Rationale was to spend resources to make the vehicle fly safer and 
not to update models and charts 
 COPV Analysts believe that should the model be updated, 
the Bayesian analysis is justification for adopting the 
competing stress ratio model.
• Bayesian Approach has been peer reviewed in the literature but 
has not fully been vetted by the Space Shuttle Program and NASA
• Alternate stress ratio model would decrease the flight risk by one 
order of magnitude (or add one ‘9’ to the reliability predictions).
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Raman NDE Technique
Use of Raman Spectroscopy and Delta Volume Growth from Void 
Collapse to Assess Overwrap Stress Gradients  Compromising the 
Reliability of Large Kevlar/Epoxy COPVs, AIAA 2009-2566 
With Jeffrey Eldridge, Glenn Research Center.
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Raman Spectroscopy: Potential NDE Technique
62
Potential technique to assess 
COPV health through Non 
Destructive Evaluation (NDE) 
Techniques.
Instead of estimating the stress from the change in tank 
volume, hypothesis is to measure the strain using a Raman 
Spectrometer on the exterior of the tank and correlate to stress 
through the thickness of the overwrap.   (Nobel Prize 1930)
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Kaiser Measurements: SN001
Measurements have 
precision to distinguish 
different wraps.
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Stress Through Overwrap Thickness
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Raman as an NDE Technique
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Relook at Reliability
SN020 – currently carried as 310 in3.  Would Raman measurements 
change current risk level? update reliability to two 9’s or four 9’s?
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Conclusion
 Variability and Uncertainty in Orbiter Fleet has 
motivated the Orbiter Engineering Team to investigate 
alternative approaches to assess safety on flight COPV.
 NDE Technique of Raman Spectroscopy is shown to 
quantitatively assess tank health and preliminary 
results show the method could provide a screen to 
detect unreliable flight articles.
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Future of COPV
 Composite vessels used extensively in space 
applications 
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International Space Station:
Current Configuration
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International Space Station:
NORS Development
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Nitrogen Oxygen 
Recharge System:
Shuttle currently 
supplies gasses to ISS
Post Shuttle 
Retirement COPVs 
will deliver O2 and N2.
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Backup Charts
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